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COMMENT
DISCOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S WORK PRODUCT AND
OTHER TRIAL PREPARATIONS IN NEW YORK
The purpose of discovery is to equalize the resources available to the opposing
parties in litigation. Discovery advances the function of the trial-i.e., the
ascertainment of the truth-and accelerates the disposition of the suit at bar.1
The Civil Practice Law and Rules2 reflects the legislature's intent to broaden
and liberalize disclosure proceedings and to encourage attorneys
to settle their
3
procedural disputes informally, without the aid of the courts.
Section 3101 of the CPLR provides that "there shall be full disclosure of all
evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action .

.

.

.

4 It then sets forth the following exceptions:

1. Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 411, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (1st Dep't 1964);
LaFrance, Work-Product Discovery: A Critique, 68 Dick. L. Rev. 351 (1964).
2. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101.
3. Chester v. Zima, 41 Misc. 2d 676, 677-78, 246 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup. CL 1964);
Roma v. Newspaper Consol. Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 1085, 244 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
The court in Montgomery Ward Co. v. City of Lockport, 44 Misc. 2d 923, 924, 255 N.Y.S.2d
433, 435 (Sup. Ct. 1964), construed the legislative intent to allow "as much information
material to the issues and normally in possession or under the control of one party [to] ...
be obtained by the other in the interests of truth and justice .... "
4. Subsection (a) of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101 retains the requirement of § 288 of the Civil
Practice Act, that discoverable material must be "material and necessary." The courts
have taken a liberal view in defining these requirements. The term "material" has been
construed to mean evidence which is competent and relevent to the legal issues, Lipin v.
Salkin, 11 Misc. 2d 877, 176 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1958), or which could become relevent,
Cornell v. Eaton, 286 App. Div. 1124, 146 N.Y.S.2d 449 (3d Dep't 1955) (memorandum decision). The articles sought need not be primary evidence, admissible at trial in direct proof
of a fact in issue. If the information sought could be used in rebuttal or cross-examination, it
is considered "material" evidence. In the Matter of Genesee Valley Union Trust Co., 21 App.
Div. 2d 843, 250 N.YS.2d 753 (4th Dep't 1964) (memorandum decision); Padilla v. Damascus, 16 App. Div. 2d 71, 225 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1st Dep't 1962), aff'd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 1059, 190
N.E.2d 243, 239 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1963). The possibility that evidence sought to be discovered
might be held immaterial at trial is not sufficient to defeat a motion for discovery. 0'Grady
v. Burr, 2 App. Div. 2d 712, 153 N.Y.S.2d 412 (2d Dep't 1956) (memorandum decision);
Amster v. Kahn, 61 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1946). However, where the articles sought do not
relate to any issue raised by the pleadings, they are not considered material. M B Steel Corp.
v. United Steel Warehouse Corp., 23 App. Div. 2d 579, 256 N.YS.2d 401 (2d Dep't 1965)
(memorandum decision).
The term "necessary" has been liberally interpreted to encompass evidence which is
needful and pertinent. Thus, the party seeking disclosure need not show that the evidence
is essential or requisite to the preparation of his case. Taylor v. L. C. Smith & Corona
Typewriters, Inc., 179 Misc. 290, 38 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 266 App.
Div. 903, 43 N.Y.S.2d 745 (4th Dep't 1943); Parsons v. Moss, 171 Misc. 828, 13 N.YS.2d
865 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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(b) Privileged matter. Upon objection by a party privileged matter shall not be
obtainable.
(c) Attorney's work product. The work product of an attorney shall not be
obtainable.
(d) Material prepared for litigation. The following shall not be obtainable unless
the court finds that the material can no longer be duplicated because of a change in
conditions and that withholding it will result in injustice or undue hardship:
1. any opinion of an expert prepared for litigation; and
2. any writing or anything created by or for a party or his agent in preparation for
litigation.

Section 3101 is, in part, a reenactment and simplification of scattered provisions
in the Civil Practice Act, and, in part, a consolidation of many of the case law
restrictions which have troubled the New York courts. Subsection (b) reiterates
the well-established rule that matters which would be privileged at trial cannot
be discovered prior to the trial. 5 The exception of privileged matter existed
5. The privilege encompasses material which would be self-incriminating. In Bradley v.
O'Hare, 2 App. Div. 2d 436, 156 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1st Dep't 1956), an action between two
labor unions involving alleged misappropriation of assets, refusal to answer questions on
pre-trial examination, which might have been incriminating, was held proper. The
defendant in Woolson Spice Co. v. Columbia Trust Co., 193 App. Div. 346, 183 N.Y. Supp.
400 (1st Dep't 1920), was not required to answer pre-trial questions which would tend to
prove him guilty of larceny. But see Levine v. Bornstein, 7 App. Div. 2d 995, 183 N.Y.S.2d
868 (2d Dep't) (memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 6 N.Y.2d 892, 190 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1959),
where the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint due to the plaintiff's refusal to
answer incriminating questions in pre-trial examination was granted.
The privilege also protects material which relates to confidential communications madie
between spouses during marriage, Kaplan v. Sacks, 8 App. Div. 2d 731, 187 N.Y.S.2d
304 (2d Dep't 1959) (memorandum decision), between penitents and clergymen, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 4505, between patients and doctors, Hughes v. Kackas, 3 App. Div. 2d 402, 161
N.Y.S.2d 541 (3d Dep't 1957), and clients and attorneys.
The attorney-client privilege encompasses communications made to the attorney by the
client in seeking legal advice for any purpose, even though there is no pending or
anticipated litigation. Root v. Wright, 84 N.Y. 72 (1881). However, the privilege is allowed
only where the attorney is acting in his professional capacity as an attorney. Lifschltz v.
O'Brien, 143 App. Div. 180, 127 N.Y. Supp. 1091 (2d Dep't 1911). Thus, where one consults
an attorney as a friend, rather than as a lawyer, the privilege may not be Invoked. Haulenbeek v. McGibbon, 60 Hun. 26, 14 N.Y. Supp. 393 (Sup. Ct. 1891). However, It should be
noted that the privilege is not restricted to communications with the lawyer himself. Rather,
it extends to communications made to the lawyer's agent. E.g., Sibley v. Waffle, 16 N.Y. 180
(1857). Furthermore, the communication will not be privileged unless made in confidence.
Although there is no requirement that an explicit request be made by the client to keep
the communication confidential, the circumstances of the case must show by implication
that the communication was to be confidential. In the Matter of the Estate of Decker,
149 Misc. 364, 268 N.Y. Supp. 280 (Surr. Ct. 1933). Certainly the presence of a third party,
who is neither the agent of the attorney nor the client, indicates that the communication
was not made in confidence. Baumann v. Steingester, 213 N.Y. 328, 107 N.E. 578 (1915).
It should be noted that although the attorney and client may invoke the privilege, It
belongs solely to the client and therefore may be waived only by him. See Bloodgood v.
Lynch, 293 N.Y. 308, 314, 56 N.E.2d 718, 721 (1944).
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under sections 349 and 351-54 of the Civil Practice Act" and exists under rule
26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7
Although the privileges granted under subsections (c) and (d) had no
former statutory counterparts, they were recognized under the New York8 and
federal case law. 9 The New York courts, under the Civil Practice Act, followed
the rule of Hickman v. Taylor,'0 wherein the term "work product" was conceived, and granted an attorney's work product only a qualified privilege." Prior
to the enactment of the CPLR, the New York State Advisory Committee on
Practice and Procedure proposed, in essence, that the legislature adopt the Hickman rule and thus allow discovery of an attorney's work product upon a showing
of sufficient cause.' 2 The legislature, however, in enacting the CPLR, granted,
without explanation, absolute immunity to an attorney's work product.' 3 Since
the CPLR affords other trial preparations only a qualified immunity, it becomes
of great practical importance to define clearly the requisites of each privilege.
I.

ATToRNEY's WoRK PRODUCT

14
As noted, the term work product had its inception in Hickman v. Taylor.
In that case, it appeared that defendant's boat had sunk and that four of the
crew had drowned. The attorney for the defendant, anticipating litigation,
procured statements from the survivors. When the plaintiff brought his action,
he filed interrogatories demanding the statements. Defendant refused to answer
them, claiming that the statements were his work product. The United States
Supreme Court ruled that the statements were privileged from disclosure. The
Court defined an attorney's work product as written statements, private
memoranda and trial preparations which reflect the trial strategy, opinions, or

6. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 593; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 359; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1953,

ch. 124; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 285.
7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
8. Fromkes v. Northeastern Life Ins. Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 477, 212 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1st
Dep't 1961) (memorandum decision); DiLaura v. State, 275 App. Div. 639, 93 N.YS.2d
107 (4th Dep't 1949) (per curiam); Surmanek v. State, 18 Misc. 2d 343, 186 N.Y.S.2d 886
(Ct. Cl. 1959); Kantor v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 23 Misc. 2d 988, 204 N.Y.S.2d 320 (Sup.
Ct. 1960).
9. Caruso v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 675 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Newell
v. Capital Transit Co., 7 F.R.D. 732 (D.D.C. 1948); Thomas v. Pennsylvania R.R., 7
F.R.D. 610 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
10. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
11. The court in Erenberg v. Brill, 10 App. Div. 2d 769, 197 N.Y.S.2d 518 (3d Dep't
1960) (memorandum decision) (dictum), stated that work product may not be discovered
absent a showing of necessity or an indication that a denial would unduly prejudice the
preparation of the attorney's case or cause him any hardship or injustice. The court in
Roach v. City of Albany, 282 App. Div. 807, 122 N.Y.S.2d 437 (3d Dep't 1953), stated that
where disclosure of work product is essential to one's case, discovery may properly be had.
12.
13.

See 1 N.Y. Adv. Comm. Rep. 119 (1957).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(c).

14. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). For a constructive criticism of the rationale behind Hickman,
see LaFrance, supra note 1, at 363-80.
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legal skill of the attorney and which have been prepared for litigation by him
in his professional capacity.' 5 Although Hickman is not binding on the New
York courts, they have accepted its work product definition in determining the
scope of subsection (c). 11
A.

Work Which Reflects Legal Skill

If the material sought to be discovered was prepared by the attorney in a
non-legal capacity and could have been prepared with equal skill by a layman,
the trial preparations would not be protected under subsection (c).1 Thus,
a photograph taken by an attorney, since it allegedy does not reflect his legal
skill, is not considered work product.' 8 However, a different conclusion is
reached with respect to the statement of a witness taken by the attorney
himself in preparation for litigation. 9
The New York courts, under the CPLR, have generally restricted the
Hickman definition to the facts of that particular case and have not expanded
the privilege to encompass material prepared for the attorney by a third party
under the theory that since the lawyer was not involved in the material's
15. 329 U.S. at 509-11.
16. Reese v. Long Island R.R., 46 Misc. 2d 5, 259 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1965), rev'd
mem. on other grounds, 24 App. Div. 2d 581, 262 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1965); In
the Matter of the City of New York, 43 Misc. 2d 173, 250 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
Babcock v. Jackson, 40 Misc. 2d 757, 243 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1963). "[W]hat constitutes
the work product of an attorney has been touched upon by New York courts and in most,
if not all cases, the case of Hickman v. Taylor . . . has been the basis of the decisions."
Id. at 761, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
17. O'Neill v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 47 Misc. 2d
765, 263 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Civ. Ct. 1965); cf. Snyder v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y.
1956); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 1027 (1961).
18. In Mudge v. Thomas J. Hughes Constr. Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 106, 108, 225 N.Y.S.2d
833, 836 (Ist Dep't 1962) (dictum), post accident photographs, showing scaffolding and
construction conditions, were stated to be subject to pretrial discovery. Cf. Roach v. City
of Albany, 282 App. Div. 807, 122 N.Y.S.2d 437 (3d Dep't 1953) (memorandum decision);
De Vito v. New York Central R.R., 32 Misc. 2d 494, 146 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd
mem., 3 App. Div. 2d 692, 159 N.Y.S.2d 468 (4th Dep't 1957); Similarly, in Howe v. McBride, 193 Misc. 271, 84 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup. Ct. 1948) photographs of the accident scene
were held to be discoverable on the ground that it did not constitute the work product of
the attorney.
19. In Babcock v. Jackson, 40 Misc. 2d 757, 761, 243 N.Y.S.2d 715, 720 (Sup. Ct. 1963)
(dictum) the court stated that a statement taken by an attorney in preparing his case
should be immune from discovery and inspection.
The rationale behind the distinction is that the attorney's legal training would be required
for the creation of the statement of the witness while a photograph or a statement of a witness which was merely dictated to a stenographer would not require the attorney's legal skill
and therefor would not be his work product. See 3 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, N.Y. Civ. Prac.
§ 3101.47 (1964).
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preparation, it could not reflect his legal skill.20 It should be noted, however, that
a few New York courts have, without explanation, shielded material procured
by the attorney's employee or agent.21 These decisions are questionable.
While it could be argued that the attorney's legal skill and ingenuity prompted
him to direct the third party to obtain the material, such reasoning would
result in all of an attorney's trial preparations being considered his work product.
In that the legislature distinguished between an attorney's work product and
other trial preparations, it is clear that this was not its intention. To make
the Hickman test at all reasonable in the context of absolute privilege, it would
seem that the courts should restrict their consideration to the four corners of
the material being sought for discovery and, from its contents alone, determine
22
whether it reflects the attorney's legal skill.

The confusion on this point in the federal courts has been far greater than
in New York. In Alltmont v. United States2 the court stated that there is
"ino logical basis for making any distinction between statements of witnesses
secured by a party's trial counsel personally . . . and those obtained by others
for the use of the party's trial counsel. In each case the statements are obtained
in preparation for litigation and ultimately find their way into trial counsel's
files ...

,24

But, the AllItmont decision has not been universally followed. In United States
20. In Reese v. Long Island R.R., 46 Misc. 2d 5, 6, 259 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (Sup. CL),
rev'd mem. on other grounds, 24 App. Div. 2d 581, 262 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1965), the
court stated that the protection afforded to an attorney's work product should be limited to
material actually prepared by an attorney, acting as an attorney, representing the litigant.
Similarly, the court in In the Matter of the City of New York, 43 Misc. 2d 173, 250 N.Y.S2d
664 (Sup. Ct. 1964) noted that the work product privilege should permit avoidance of disclosure of material which is prepared by an attorney and contains his notes, analysis and trial
strategy. In Parker v. New York Telephone Co., 47 Misc. 2d 342, 262 N.YS.2d 700 (Sup.
Ct) aff'd mem., 24 App. Div. 2d 1067, 265 N.Y.S.2d 740 (3d Dep't 1965) statements of witnesses taken by an agent of the attorney were not considered work product.
21. In Montgomery Ward Co. v. City of Lockport, 44 Misc. 2d 923, 255 N.Y.S.2d 433
(Sup. Ct. 1964), the court impliedly extended the privilege to material obtained by third
parties under the direction of the attorney. "All that is sought here is the report of the
investigator, working on his own, and not as an agent or employee of the attorney, as to
what he discoverd while making that investigation." Id. at 925, 255 N.Y..2d at 436. In
Babcock v. Jackson, 40 M,isc. 2d 757, 761, 243 N.Y.S.2d 715, 720 (Sup. Ct. 1963), the
court included, as work product, material obtained by the agents of an attorney. However,
the court expressly distinguished the work of an agent from that of an independent insurance
adjuster working on behalf of the insurance company, the latter not being work product of
the attorney.
22. See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra, where it is argued that the New York Legislature should abrogate the work product concept thereby rendering it unnecessary to make an
artificial distinction between legal skill reflected in the material itself and that reflected in
the procurement of the material.
23. 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
24. Id. at 976.
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v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 25 the court held that statements obtained by claims
agents and investigators for use by the attorney were not shielded by the work

product privilege, while in Snyder v. United States20 an opposite conclusion was

reached with respect to statements obtained by Air Force investigators in

anticipation of litigation arising from an airplane crash.
B. Preparedfor Litigation
The work of the attorney must be prepared in anticipation of litigation before

he may invoke the work product privilege. 27 Although the privilege allows

materials to be acquired prior to the commencement of the action, it does not,
of course, encompass materials secured before the actual accrual of the cause

of action, 28 nor does 2it9 extend to materials that were prepared for previous
or separate litigations.

C. Acting in His Professional Capacity

The immunity attaches only if the material was secured by the attorney

acting in his professional legal capacity.3 0 Thus, if an attorney is acting in the
25. 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D.Mich. 1954). Similarly, in United States v. Certain Parcels of
Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953), the court held that material prepared by third
parties should not be afforded protection even if it were prepared under the supervision
or direction of the attorney.
26. 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956). In Hanke v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co.,
7 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1947), the court held that preparation by third parties under the
direction of counsel would be afforded protection. Accord, Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht
Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D.Ohio 1953). There the court emphasized, however, that
the agent must be acting under the direction of the attorney.
27. Montgomery Ward Co. v. City of Lockport, 44 Misc. 2d 923, 255 N.Y.S.2d 433
(Sup. Ct. 1964); Myles E. Rieser Co. v. Loew's Inc., 194 Misc. 119, 81 N.Y.S.2d 861
(Sup. Ct. 1948). In Surmanek v. State, 18 Misc. 2d 343, 186 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Ct. Cl. 1959),
where a swimmer struck an underwater obstacle, the court held the swimmer was not
entitled to discovery of a survey map which was prepared solely in anticipation of litigation.
See Comment, Disclosure-Attorney's Work Product and Material Prepared for LitigationConfusion Compounded, 10 N.Y.L.F. 574, 580 (1963).
28. McManus v. Harkness, 11 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See 3 Weinstein, Korn &
Miller, op. cit. supra note 19, § 3101.49.
29. The court in Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) allowed discovery of materials prepared by an agency for general purposes of litigation, rather than for one specific action. In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Pa. 1962), materials prepared by an attorney
for a prior separate action were not considered shielded by the work product privilege. In
the Matter of the City of New York, 43 Misc. 2d 173, 250 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sup. Ct. 1964)
was a case where a city seeking to condemn property was ordered to disclose appraisals to
the real estate owners since there had been no indication that the appraisals had been
prepared primarily for the litigation at bar.
30. Montgomery Ward Co. v. City of Lockport, 44 Misc. 2d 923, 255 N.Y.S.2d 433
(Sup. Ct. 1964); Babcock v. Jackson, 40 Misc. 2d 757, 762, 243 N.Y.S.2d 713, 720 (Sup.
Ct. 1963). "The protection afforded by CPLR 3101(c) does not extend to material prepared
by an attorney unless it involves his work as a lawyer." O'Neill v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 47 Misc. 2d 765, 767, 263 N.Y.S.2d 187, 189 (Civ. Ct. 1965).
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capacity of a special investigator or a claims agent, he does not have an
absolute privilege under subsection (c).31 In Newell v. Capital Transit Co., 2
an attorney, as head of a claims department, obtained statements from witnesses.
The court held that the attorney could not invoke the work product privilege
since the statements were obtained as a function of non-legal employment,
rather than in the course of professional legal duties. 3
II.

MATERIAL PREPARED FOR LITIGATION

Even though an attorney is precluded from invoking the work product
privilege because he is unable to satisfy its several requisites, his material is
nevertheless qualifiedly privileged from disclosure under subsection (d) upon
a showing that it was obtained in preparation for litigation.34 Subsection (d)
expressly encompasses material procured by third parties without the supervision
or direction of the attorney.
A. Created by or for a Party in Preparationfor Litigation
Where material is procured for a purpose other than litigation or obtained
35
merely in the regular course of business, it is not privileged from disclosure.
Thus, reports of accidents made by employees to their employers in the regular
course of business are not protected by subsection (d), even though the
reports are later turned over to an attorney for litigation purposes.03
In New York there was a certain degree of confusion with respect to accident
reports made by an insured to his own insurance carrier. 37 However, the
31. Virginia Metal Prods. Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 10 F.R.D. 374 (S.D.N.Y.
1950); Babcock v. Jackson, 40 Misc. 2d 757, 762, 243 N.Y.S.2d 715, 720 (Sup. Ct. 1963);
In Myles E. Rieser Co. v. Loew's Inc., 194 Misc. 119, 81 N.Y..2d 861 (Sup. Ct 1948),
information which was acquired by an attorney while acting in a negotiating capacity was
held not to be privileged.
32. 7 F.R.D. 732 (D.D.C. 1948).
33. Id. at 734.
34. N.Y. C2.LJR. 3101(d).

35. In William L. Mantha Co. v. DeGraff, 266 N.Y. 581, 195 NZ. 209 (1935) (memorandum decision), account books were held to be prepared in the regular course of
business and therefore not privileged. See Bloom v. New York City Transit Authority,
20 App. Div. 2d 687, 246 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st Dep't 1964) (memorandum decision) (accident
reports) ; Stewart v. Roosevelt Hospital, 22 App. Div. 2d 648, 252 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Ist Dep't
1964) (ambulance records); In the Matter of the Estate of Phillips, 10 Misc. 2d 714, 173
N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sur. Ct. 1958) (ledger entries).
36. The first department has allowed such reports to be discovered. E.g., Stewart v.
Roosevelt Hosp., 22 App. Div. 2d 648, 252 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1st Dep't 1964). This is not the
case in the second department. In Lonigro v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 22 App. Div. 2d 918, 919,
255 N.Y.S.2d 737, 740-41 (2d Dep't 1964), reports made to an employer by an employee were
held privileged, following that department's tendency to treat such reports as made in
anticipation of litigation rather than in the normal course of employment.
37. See Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1st Dep't 1964);
Speight v. Allen, 44 Misc. 2d 1072, 255 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Calace v. Battaglia,
44 Misc. 2d 97, 252 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1964). In the latter case, the court, in permitting
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confusion appears to have been settled by two recent cases, Finegold v. Lewis"8
and Kandel v. Tocker,8 9 holding that insurance reports and other material given
to the insurance carrier by the insured were matter prepared for litigation. The
Kandel court's rationale was that automobile insurance is nothing more than
litigation insurance and thus reports obtained by the insurer were in anticipation
of litigation. 40 The court made a noteworthy distinction by pointing out that
"automobile liability insurance is not to be confused with the investigation,
reports, and statements resulting from the regular internal operation of an
enterprise [where] . . . the purpose is not limited to . . . preparing for a
litigation risk. . . . In that situation the preclusive provisions of the disclosure
statutes do not apply."4'
These courts noted that the fact that the reports were obtained prior to the
commencement of the action was immaterial. 42 However, the federal district
courts have reached a contrary conclusion, 43 finding as a rule that insurance
discovery of insurance reports, reasoned that where there is any doubt in determining
whether material is protected under subsection (d), it should be resolved in favor of
disclosure to be consistent with the general policy of maximum discovery. Accord, Doughty
v. Greenberg, 43 Misc. 2d 267, 250 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
38. 22 App. Div. 2d 447, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d Dep't 1965).
39. 22 App. Div. 2d 513, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (lst Dep't 1965). In Guglulzza v. Gugluizza,
45 Misc. 2d 868, 257 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1965), the court, sitting within the fourth department, based its holding on Kandel v. Tocher, 22 App. Div. 2d 513, 515, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898,
900 (1st Dep't 1965), and Finegold v. Lewis, 22 App. Div. 2d 447, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2d
Dep't 1965), since there had been no definitive holding on this point in the fourth department. For a complete discussion of the effect of Kandel and Finegold on the prior New York
law with respect to insurance reports, see the Biannual Survey of New York Practice: Part
V, 40 St. John's L. Rev. 125, 154-59 (1965).
40. Id. at 515-16, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 900. In Raylite Elec. Corp. v. New York Fire Ins.
Co., 46 Misc. 2d 361, 259 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1965), disclosure was sought of reports made
to a fire insurance carrier by a fire adjuster. The court, in allowing disclosure, distinguished
Kandel on the ground that fire insurance, unlike automobile insurance, is not litigation
insurance. It appears, therefore, that the non-liability insurer must prove that such reports
were prepared for litigation, rather than in the course of insurance business, in order to be
shielded by subsection (d), while the liability insurer enjoys a presumption that they were
so prepared. Biannual Survey of New York Practice: Part V, supra note 39 at 159.
41. Id. at 515-16, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
42. In Finegold v. Lewis, 22 App. Div. 2d 447, 448, 256 N.Y.S.2d 358, 359 (2d Dep't
1965), the court stated that "the relative dates of the delivery of the statement and of the
commencement of the action are immaterial." Accord, Kandel v. Tocher, 22 App. Div. 2d 513,
256 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1st Dep't 1965); Zavaglia v. Englert, 23 App. Div. 2d 790, 258 N.Y.S.2d
720 (2d Dep't 1965) ; Schulgasser v. Young, 25 Misc. 2d 788, 206 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
An insured's statement to an insurer was held to be protected even though the insurer had
not retained counsel. Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
The court reasoned that the insurer was under a contractual duty to defend the Insured
in anticipation of litigation.
43. Burke v. United States, 32 F.R.D. 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Colpak v. Hetterick,
40 F. Supp. 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Price v. Levitt, 29 F. Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); Bough
v. Lee, 28 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). See Comment, Disclosure-Attorney's Work Product
and Material Prepared for Litigation-Confusion Compounded, 10 N.Y.L.F. 574, 588 (1964).
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reports obtained prior to the commencement of the law suit are obtained in
the routine course of insurance business and hence are not privileged.
B. Opinion of an Expert
Subsection (d) extends the privilege to the work of experts prepared in
anticipation of litigation. If, however, the court finds that the opinion of the
4
expert was prepared in the normal course of a business, it is not protected.
In determining, as subsection (d) requires, whether undue hardship would
result in the absence of disclosure, the courts seem reluctant to grant disclosure
of an expert's opinions where the mere disclosure of his factual findings would
be sufficient. Thus, where certain articles could no longer be examined, the court
allowed discovery of the notes of the expert, but not of his opinions or
conclusions. 45
C. Impossibility of Duplication ad Undue Hardship
The privilege is lost upon a showing of both the unavailability of the material
sought and undue hardship. 46 Where the information sought is exclusively in
the possession and control of the other party, the requirement of impossibility of
duplication is met 7 It is also satisfied when the party seeking disclosure can
show that the resources required for duplication are destroyed or unavailable. 48
However, the fact that the party seeking disclosure will be put to an expense in
obtaining a duplication is not sufficient to waive the requirement.4 9 Nor will the
court necessarily order disclosure where the unavailable information previously
could have been obtained, but the party seeking disclosure failed to do so.0'
44. Fibron Prods., Inc. v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 26 Misc. 2d 779, 206 N.YS.2d 659
(Sup. Ct. 1960). See Reese v. Long Island R.R., 46 Misc. 2d 5, 259 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. CL)
rev'd mem. on other grounds, 24 App. Div. 2d 581, 262 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1965);
Baczmaga v. Reynolds, 44 Misc. 2d 997, 255 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
45. Pfaudler Permutit, Inc. v. Stanley Steel Service Corp., 28 Misc. 2d 388, 212 N.Y.S.2d
106 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Colden v. R. J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
46. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d).
47. Roma v. Newspaper Consol. Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 1085, 244 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. CL
1963); Caswell v. United Air Lines, 191 Misc. 941, 78 N.YS.2d 387 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
48. In Sherman v. MT.Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 770, 248 N.Y.S.2d 1000
(Sup. Ct. 1964), the court ordered disclosure of test reports where the article tested was no
longer available. Accord, Lachowitz v. Child's Hospital, 32 Misc. 2d 386, 225 N.YS.2d 123
(Sup. Ct. 1961); Babcock v. Jackson, 40 Misc. 2d 757, 243 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. CL 1963);
Pfaudler Permutit, Inc. v. Stanley Steel Serv. Corp., 28 Misc. 2d 388, 212 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup.
Ct. 1961); Petruk v. South Ferry Realty Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 533, 157 N.YS.2d 249 (2d
Dep't 1956).
49. In Renwal Prods., Inc. v. Kleen-Stik Prods., Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 644, 251 N.Y-S.2d
776 (Sup. Ct. 1964), the fact that plaintiff was a small company and wished to avoid the
expense of making its own test was held not to be sufficient to waive the requirement.
50. Fibron Prods., Inc. v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 26 Misc. 2d 779, 206 N.Y.S.2d 659
(Sup. Ct. 1960). But see Kaye v. Penguin Cab Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 476, 243 N.YS.2d 380
(Sup. Ct. 1963), where the court stated it would be unreasonable to deny disclosure of a
deceased's statement on the ground that the party seeking disclosure could have procured the
statement prior to the witnesses' death.
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In exercising its discretion, the courts consider, of course, the particular
circumstances of the case at bar in determining whether undue hardship would
ensue from non-disclosure.Y' Certainly if the material is necessary and essential
to the party seeking disclosure for the preparation of his case, discovery should
be allowed. Thus, the courts usually i'equire disclosure of names of witnesses
since this is considered information crucial to
who have relevant information,
52
the adversary's case.
III.
A.

A

CRITIQUE

Absolute or Qualified Privilege

As previously noted, the New York courts, under the CPLR, have accepted
the Hickman concept of work product in defining that term as it is found in
subsection (c).5 However, it must be realized that Hickman granted only a
qualified privilege to an attorney's work product, allowing it to be discovered
upon a showing of sufficient cause. The Court expressly stated that if work
product were absolutely privileged from disclosure "the liberal ideals of the
deposition-discovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be
stripped of much of their meaning. '5 4 Thus, it is doubtful that the Hickman
Court would have defined an attorney's work product in such broad and
nebulous terms if the privilege afforded it were to be absolute.
Under the CPLR, if an attorney takes the statement of a witness to an
accident, it is considered his work product and absolutely shielded from discovery
even though the witness is now unavailable and his statement is essential to
the other party's claim or defense. Such absolute protection is unwarranted, 5
tends to create unjust results, and thwarts the underlying CPLR policy of
maximum disclosure.56 Apparently recognizing this anomalous situation, the
New York Judicial Conference has recently recommended that subsection (c)
be repealed and that subsection (d) be amended to expressly include an attorney's
51. Roebling v. Anderson, 257 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert denied, 366 U.S. 918
(1961); Kaye v. Penguin Cab Co., 40 Misc. 2d 476, 243 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1963);
Howe v. McBride, 193 Misc. 271, 84 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
52. Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 33 F.R.D. 283 (W.D. Mo. 1962); Kaye v.
Penguin Cab Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 476, 243 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
53. Cases cited note 16 supra.
54. 329 U.S. at 512.
55. Admittedly, there are some trial preparations, such as an attorney's trial strategy or
legal research, which an adversary should not be permitted to discover. However, even If
work product were given only a qualified privilege, such material would be amply protected
since the party seeking disclosure would as a practical matter be unable to show sufficient
cause for its disclosure. See LaFrance, Work Product Discovery: A Critique, 68 Dick. L. Rev.
351, 369 (1964) where he states that there has been no demand for such materials In any
reported case.
56. See Montgomery Ward Co. v. City of Lockport, 44 Misc. 2d 923, 924, 255 N.Y.S.2d
433, 435 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Calace v. Battaglia, 44 Misc. 2d 97, 99, 252 N.Y.S.2d 973, 975
(Sup. Ct. 1964).
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work product, thereby making all trial preparations only qualifiedly immune.57
The legislature has not approved this proposal.5 s
B. Abrogation of the Work Product Concept
While the legislature would be well advised to accept the Conference's
recommendation that subsection (c) be repealed, the recommendation that
subsection (d) be amended to include an attorney's work product is of questionable merit.
Although the Hickman doctrine of work product appears justified in theory,
its application tends to create artificial and unclear standards and restrictions.59
If, for example, an attorney photographs an accident scene, it is not his work
product,60 but if he diagrams the same scene, it is.01 In the latter case, the
attorney theoretically exercised his legal skill. But could it not be said that all
trial preparations of an attorney reflect his legal skill either in the actual content
of the material, or in knowing when and what to prepare for litigation? It seems
incongruous that legal skill is protected in the former situation and not the
latter, since disclosure in either situation could be equally prejudicial to the
attorney.
If the term "work product" is inserted in subsection (d), there is still the
danger that the courts will continue to distinguish between work product and
other trial preparations. Hickman, which granted only a qualified privilege to
work product and non-work product alike, nevertheless distinguished between
them and required that something more than ordinary good cause, which was
sufficient for discovery of non-work product, be established by the moving
party in order to discover work product. The New York courts, prior to the
CPLR, distinguished between work product and other trial preparations even
though both classifications were only qualifiedly privileged from disclosure.
Although the Conference's proposal would allow both work product and material
prepared for litigation to be discovered upon a showing of impossibility of
duplication and undue hardship, it is conceivable that the courts would define
undue hardship in a stricter sense upon finding that the material sought was
encompassed by the Hickman concept of work product.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the artificial standards resulting from the work product rule require its
rejection, new limitations must be established to safeguard the attorney.
57. See Ass. Intro. No. 3088, Pr. No. 3163, N.Y. State Leg. 189th Sess. (1966).
58. Although the bill was passed in the Assembly, it was never reported out of the
Senate Code Committee.
59. See generally Biannual Survey of New York Practice: Part V, supra note 39;
Comment, Attorney's Work Product Rule-An Area of Confusion, 31 Fordharn L. Rev.
530 (1963).
60. Cases cited note 18 supra.
61. Surmanek v. State, 18 Misc. 2d 343, 186 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Ct. Cl. 1959), where plaintiff
was not entitled to discovery of a diagram which had been prepared solely for defense purposes. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
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Obviously, the disclosure of some trial preparations would be more prejudicial
to the disclosing attorney than others. The disclosure of a witness's statement,
for example, would prejudice the disclosing attorney's case to a greater extent
than the mere disclosure of a witness' name. There is no reason why the courts
should not distinguish among materials sought to be discovered on the ground
of undue prejudice.
This can be accomplished by amending subsection (d) to expressly provide,
in addition to the present requirement of a showing of impossibility of duplication
by the moving party, that the court, before ordering disclosure, balance the
undue prejudice that would result to the disclosing party with the potential undue
hardship to the movant if discovery were denied. Under such a test, the ultimate
intent of Hickman in formulating the work product concept, which was to
protect the disclosing attorney from undue prejudice, would be fulfilled without
forcing inequitable and inflexible distinctions between work product and other
trial preparations.

